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This research develops a theory about the role of inequality in the overtaking
of growth performance across countries. The theory captures two opposing
eﬀects of inequality on factor accumulation and suggests that the qualitative
change in their combined eﬀect is a prime cause of overtaking. Due to the
initial dominance of the positive eﬀect of inequality, a less egalitarian economy
undergoes a higher growth path in the short run, followed by a lower growth
path in the long run. It is also shown that divergence or convergence may
arise instead of overtaking, depending on the initial levels of development and
inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two centuries, the evolution of the world income distribution has been
characterized by shifts in the ranking of countries, as well as the great divergence and
a recent convergence among industrialized economies. As documented by Maddison
(2001), the Netherlands, whose per capita GDP had been the highest in Europe since
1600, was overtaken by the United Kingdom towards the end of the ninetieth century.
The economic leadership was then replaced by the United states in the beginning of
the twentieth century. Outside the Western world, Japan and newly industrializing
countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) had overtaken Argentina
and Chile during the second half of the twentieth century.1
Growth theorists have attempted to construct the theoretical foundations that ac-
count for these unpredictable phenomena, and three major approaches have been pro-
posed so far. The ￿rst approach, taken by Brezis et al.(1993), suggests that overtaking
re￿ects country-speci￿cl e a r n i n ge ﬀects in the existing technology and the resulting
comparative disadvantage of a leading economy in adopting a new technology. The sec-
ond approach highlights the international ￿ows of ideas. Goodfriend and McDermott
(1998) argue that familiarity with a trading partner facilitates technological spillovers
and enhances learning productivity, human capital accumulation, and growth. Thus,
overtaking is caused by unilateral familiarization of a less developed country with the
leading country.2 The third approach focuses on the changing role of natural resources
in the process of development. Galor et al.(2002) suggest that while land abundance
is bene￿cial for the process of development in early stages, it hinders the execution of
education reform that is a precondition for industrialization and sustained growth.
This research examines the role of income inequality in the overtaking of growth per-
formance across countries. It employs a uni￿ed approach that captures two opposing
eﬀect of inequality on factor accumulation, and thereby examines the link between ini-
tial income distribution and the pattern of development. Inequality promotes physical
capital accumulation by stimulating savings of the rich, whose marginal propensity to
save is relatively high.3 A tt h es a m et i m e ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fc r e d i tm a r k e ti m p e r f e c -
tions, low-income households have limited access to loans to ￿nance their education.4
1See Abramovitz (1986), Quah (1993, 1996), Jones (1997), and Pritchett (1997) for the disccusion on
the long-run evolution of the world income distribution.
2See Fischer and Serra (1996) and Mountford (1998) for other studies that emphasize international
links in overtaking. The former demonstrate that due to the local externality of human capital, a
country with a highly equal income distribution may overtake leaders. The latter ￿nds a source of
overtaking in the dynamic structure of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model.
3See Keynes (1936), Kaldor (1957), Stiglitz (1969), and Bourguignon (1981) for theretical considera-
tions, and Mayer (1966), Carrol (2000), and Dynan et al.(2000) for empirical evidence. The last paper
￿nds that higher lifetime income hoseholds save a larger fraction of their income for precauitonary
saving and bequest motives.
4Flug et al.(1998) draw evidence from cross-country and panel regressions that credit market imperfec-
tions and unequal wealth distribution lead to lower average secondary enrollment. Perotti (1996) empir-
ically supports the view that income equality encourages both male and female education attainments.3
Since each individual￿s investment in human capital is subject to diminishing mar-
ginal returns, concentrating resources into a small part of the population retards the
accumulation of aggregate human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
The relationship between distribution of personal income and economic growth has
been one of the most controversial topics in macroeconomics over the last decade.
Despite considerable number of empirical investigations, little is known about the rela-
tionship between these two factors within a single country. Most studies in the 1990s
support the view that inequality is a hindrance to growth, while some recent studies ￿nd
that their relationship turns positive in the short run.5 Although these puzzling results
would re￿ect, to some extent, diﬀerences in estimation methods as well as data qual-
ity, it appears that this empirical ambiguity may re￿ect opposing forces that operate
simultaneously.6
The proposed theory attributes the overtaking to a qualitative change in the com-
bined eﬀect of inequality on physical and human capital accumulation. The positive
eﬀect of inequality on physical capital accumulation is dominant in the early stages of
development, where the return to skill is low relative to the return to physical capital
and the saving-rate diﬀerential among the rich and poor is signi￿cant. Capital accumu-
lation and the accompanying increase in wages, however, raises the return to skill and
reduces the saving-rate diﬀerential, reversing the qualitative eﬀect of initial inequality
in later stages.7
The eventual dominance of the negative eﬀect of inequality generates multiple steady-
state equilibria. A country characterized by a substantially equal distribution will
converge to the higher-level steady state, in terms of per capita output, where all
individuals can equally acquire skills and accumulate wealth. On the other hand, a
country characterized by a highly unequal distribution will converge to the lower-level
steady state, where unskilled workers are unable to accumulate wealth and inequality
exists persistently between skilled and unskilled workers. The initial distribution of
wealth therefore plays a signi￿cant role in determining both long-run growth perfor-
mance and individuals￿ welfare.8 The lower-level steady state act as a development trap
because, without a substantial increase in output or equality, countries in this state can-
not permanently escape from stagnation. Despite the necessity of reducing inequality,
those countries will encounter capitalists￿ strong resistance to redistribution. As will be
5See Barro (2000) as well as Benabou￿s (1996) careful overview of the empirical studies in the early
1990s. A recent empirical work by Forbes (2000, p.885) concludes that ￿the relationship between
inequality and growth is far from resolved.￿
6For instance, Banerjee and Du￿o (2000a, 2000b) argue that the diﬀerence in previous estimates is
partly due to the linearity of the models. Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) ￿nd inappropriate to simply
use ￿high quality￿ observations in Deininger and Squire￿s (1996) data set on income inequality.
7Due to the complementarity between skill and physical capital in production, the return to skill rises
as physical capital accumulates. See Goldin and Katz (1998) for empirical evidence. Perotti (1996) ￿nds
that income equality encourages investment in education more signi￿cantly in a group of high-income
countries.
8See Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993).4
s h o w nl a t e r ,c a p i t a l i s t sc a nh o l dh i g h e rw e a l t hi nt h el o w e r - l e v e ls t e a d ys t a t et h a ni n
the others, and thus redistribution is undesirable from their short-term and long-term
viewpoints.
Overtaking therefore results from the initial dominance of the positive eﬀect of in-
equality and the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. A less egalitarian economy
would undergo a higher growth path in the short run, followed by a lower growth path
in the long run. Once overtaken, the country can never catch up with the leader and
the income gap remains open. Furthermore, divergence applies to countries starting out
in the mature stages of development where the adverse eﬀect of inequality on human
capital outweighs the positive eﬀect of inequality on aggregate saving.
Paradoxically, overtaking is likely to occur under the condition that the marginal pro-
ductivity of physical capital is higher relative to human capital. In such a circumstance,
a major fraction of national income is dominated by asset owners since production of
￿nal output relies largely on physical capital. This uneven system of factor payments
slows down the increase in wages relative to output, intensifying the adverse eﬀect of
credit constraints on human capital accumulation. It should be noted that the share
of the labor income is less important for egalitarian economies where many individuals
obtain asset earnings as well as wages.
Although the analysis suggests that inequality in the early stages of development
has a positive eﬀect on the growth process, there are two prime forces that make
overtaking less probable than divergence. The one is that, as noted above, the positive
eﬀect of inequality is the dominant factor only in underdeveloped stages, where the
saving rate diﬀerential among individuals is large. The other is that globalization of
international capital markets encourages the ￿ow of capital across borders, which makes
domestic saving less important for physical capital accumulation. The positive aspect
of inequality would thus be more relevant to the process of development experienced
by currently developed countries.
This general tendency of divergence is supported by some empirical evidence. Ben-
abou (1996) examines the role of inequality in economic development of South Korea
and the Philippines, which were similar with respect to all major macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as GDP per capita, population, urbanization, and secondary school enroll-
ment in the early 1960s. As a key factor to interpret South Korea￿s superior growth
performance over the next 25 years, Benabou points out the signi￿cant diﬀerence in
their initial distributions of income and land ownership. Inequality was much lower in
South Korea as a result of its successful land reform following World War II. In this
respect, Birdsall et al.(1995) suggest that policies that reduced poverty and income
inequality, such as improving the quality of basic education and augmenting labor de-
mand, have stimulated East Asian economies￿ growth since the 1960s. Engerman and5
Sokoloﬀ (2002) and Galor et al.(2002) argue that the divergence in income levels be-
tween North and Latin America, observed in the second half of the twentieth century,
may be attributed partly to their diﬀerent distributions of land ownership.
Turning to income convergence, countries will converge to the same steady state
provided that they possess similar economic structures and levels of initial inequality.
In particular, a country with moderate inequality can evolve toward the higher-level
steady state through the transition from selective to universal human capital accu-
mulation. Even though inequality delays the spread of education in society, moderate
inequality permits the economy to reach a stage of development where unskilled workers
are wealthy enough to support their children.9 The resulting universal investment in
education fuels the process of development, and credit constraints become less binding
among the poor over time with the improvement of inequality. The growth process
of the economy with moderate inequality would be associated with the evolution of
some currently developed countries, which might have experienced a rise and fall of
inequality over the last century, as surveyed by Kuznets (1955).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the basic struc-
ture of the model, and short-run equilibrium is derived in Section 2. The analytical
framework is based on Galor and Moav￿s (2001)u n i ￿ed growth model that features
four fundamental elements: capital market imperfections, altruistic linkage, capital-
skill complementarity, and the increasing marginal propensity to save as a result of
consumers￿ optimal behaviors.
There are two clear aspects that distinguish the current paper from Galor and Moav￿s
research. First, they do not address the issue of overtaking and divergence. Galor and
Moav divide the process of industrialization into four stages, and examine the eﬀect
of inequality in one stage on subsequent growth within the same stage (i.e., short-run
growth). This paper, by contrast, studies longer-term growth beyond the initial stage so
as to observe the diverse patterns of development. Second, Galor and Moav￿s analysis
executes the moderate redistribution of wealth so that the ex-ante state of the economy
is maintained. Drastic wealth redistribution, however, brings the economy into a state
of widespread education, and this situation would be associated with the experience of
some East Asian countries that markedly improved inequality after World War II.10 The
analysis in Section 3 carries out both drastic and moderate redistributions of wealth.
In order to accomplish these two objectives, Section 3 ￿rst elucidates the global
behavior of the dynamical system that governs the evolution of inequality and demon-
strates the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. Using these results, Section 4 analyzes
the impact of wealth distribution on the behavior of output growth, by comparing the
9Alternatively, as argued by Galor and Moav (2000), capitalists would be willing to support the
accumulation of human capital of workers in order to sustain their pro￿tr a t e s .
10Birdsall et al.(1995) cite the examples of land reforms in Korea and Taiwan, public housing in Hong
Kong, and extensive investment in rural infrastructure in Malaysia and Tahailand.6
growth paths of hypothetical economies that diﬀer only in their initial wealth distribu-
tions. The last section summarizes the discussion and proposes future research. Proofs
of technical results are placed in the Appendix.
1. THE MODEL
Consider a closed overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous agents in which
activities occur over in￿nite discrete time. People invest in assets and education in the
presence of imperfect capital markets. Producers employ the resulting physical and
human capital through perfectly competitive markets, and generate a single ￿nal good
that can be consumed or relinquished to the next generation. Population and the level
of technology are exogenously determined and constant over time.
1.1. Producers
The amount of aggregate output produced at time t, Yt,i sd e t e r m i n e db yt h ea g g r e -
gate stock of physical capital, Kt, and that of human capital, Ht, which are available
in the economy at time t. The production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt = F(Kt,H t) ≡ f(kt)Ht = Akα
t Ht, (1)
where α ∈ (0,1), kt ≡ Kt/Ht,a n dA>0 stands for a level of technology. The market
price of the ￿nal good is normalized to 1. Production operates by hiring workers
and renting the services of physical capital from households through the competitive
markets, without incurring any adjustment costs. In contrast to individuals￿ loans
for education, ￿rms can rent physical capital under no liquidity constraints on the
grounds that physical capital is easily collateralized. Hence, they maximize their pro￿ts
given the market wage per unit of human capital, wt, and the rental price per unit of
physical capital, rt.T h o s e￿rms are represented by a single producer who maximizes




wt = f(kt) − f0(kt)kt =( 1− α)Akα
t ≡ w(kt),
(2)
which are the inverse demand functions for Kt and Ht in terms of the factor ratio
kt. The rate of return to human capital, wt, increases with physical capital due to
the complementarity between them. Physical capital depreciates at a constant rate of
δ ∈ [0,1] in every period.
1.2. Households
1.2.1. Environment. A new generation of individuals is born in every period, and indi-
viduals live for two periods. Thus there are two generations in society at each point in
time. Each individual has a single parent when young, and has a single child when old.
The number of members of a generation is normalized to one. Individuals may diﬀer7
from each other in their initial endowments, yet they are homogeneous in all the other
aspects. The preferences of an individual who is born in period t are de￿ned over ct+1,
consumption of the individual and his/her child in period t +1 ,a n dbt+1,t h ew e a l t h
transferred to the child in period t +1 . They are represented by the utility function
u(ct+1,b t+1)=( 1− β)lnct+1 + β ln(ﬂ θ + bt+1), (3)
where β ∈ (0,1) and ﬂ θ > 0. The underlying assumption of (3) is that intergenerational
transfers are a luxury good and are motivated by parents￿ ￿joy of giving.￿ The non-
negative amount of wealth is necessarily transferred to oﬀspring since the utility is an
increasing function of bt+1.
In period 0, old people in society are divided into two groups, S (Small) and L
(Large). Group i (i = S,L) involves a fraction λi of them, where 0 < λS =1−λL < 0.5
and λi remains unchanged over time once determined in period 0. Members within a
group are endowed with the same amount of wealth, Ii
0, whereas individuals between
the two groups may diﬀer in this regard. As follows from (3), this between-group
inequality generates the diﬀerence in their intergenerational transfers. On the other
hand, since members within one group are completely homogeneous, their descendents
behave identically in all subsequent periods. Hence an individual who is descended
from group i a n di sb o r ni np e r i o dt may be referred to as a member i of generation t.
In the ￿rst period, when young, individuals consume part of their parents￿ wealth
to live and spend the entire time to acquire skills. The formation of human capital is
augmented by investing physical resources in education, and the investment during the
￿rst period is the only way to enhance human capital. Hence, individuals allocate their
inheritance between education (investment in human capital) and savings (investment






t is the transfer from his/her parent and ei
t is the real expenditure on education.
In the second period, when old, the individual acquires the resulting human capital
hi
t+1 ≡ h(ei
t), which is an increasing function with strict concavity and Inada condi-
tions.11 Individuals acquire only basic skills in the absence of the real expenditure
on education, and the associated level of human capital is h(0) = 1. Wage income is
obtained by supplying the acquired human capital inelastically in competitive labor
markets. In addition, those who have savings rent out capital services to producers at











11The assumption of Inada conditions, which deviates from the Galor-Moav (2001) model, is necessary
to avoid a corner solution at which there is no incentive to invest in education. Alternative speci￿cations
complicate the exposition with no change in the basic results. See Footnote 12a sw e l l .8
where Rt+1 =1+rt+1 − δ. The budget constraint of the individual is given by
ct+1 + bt+1 ≤ Ii
t+1. (5)
1.2.2. Optimization. Each member of generation t maximizes his/her utility from (3)







t+1 − θ) if Ii
t+1 ≥ θ,
(6)
where θ ≡ ﬂ θ(1−β)/β > 0 can be interpreted as the minimum need of current consump-
tion. Since the bequest function and the associated saving function exhibit convexity,
inequality in wealth augments national saving.
Observe that the indirect utility strictly monotonically increases with the second
period￿s wealth, Ii
t+1. It then follows from (4) that utility is maximized by choosing
the education costs that maximize Ii
t+1. Therefore, the optimal level of education in
the face of no credit constraints, denoted as et,i s
et =a r gm a x
e
[wt+1h(e) − eRt+1], (7)
where individuals regard both wage and interest rate as given and predict these future
variables accurately at time t.T h e￿rst order condition is
wt+1h0(et)=Rt+1 for wt+1 > 0. (8)
Also, et =0for wt+1 =0s i n c ez e r ow a g ey i e l d sn or e t u r no ni n v e s t m e n ti ne d u c a t i o n .
Then noting wt+1 = w(kt+1) and Rt+1 =1+rt+1 − δ ≡ R(kt+1) from (2), there exists
a continuous single-valued function
et = e(kt+1), (9)
such that e(0) = 0 and e0(kt+1) > 0 for all kt+1 > 0.12 The intuition of the positive
reaction of education to the capital-labor ratio is straightforward: an increase in kt+1
enhances the return on human capital, wt+1, while it reduces the return on savings,
Rt+1. et is hence independent of bi
t, meaning that it is most favored among all young
members at time t.I n o t h e r w o r d s , et is the education expenditure one is willing to
pay if one can.
Next consider the optimal educational decision in light of credit constraints. It is
assumed that imperfect capital markets completely limit access to credit, and young
members are unable to make loans for education. Then a member i of generation t










12In contrast to the present model, Galor and Moav (2001) propose Regime I, a state of the economy
with no investment in education, which nulli￿es the adverse eﬀect of inequality on production. Inequal-
ity therefore enhances the process of development in this regime. We will prove that this positive eﬀect
of inequality exists even in the absence of Regime I.9
Contrary to the ￿rst case, ei
t will be heterogeneous across the two groups, depending


















t, meaning that savings equal parent￿s wealth minus household￿s consumption
and education costs. si
t c a nh e n c eb ev i e w e da st h ea m o u n ts a v e db yah o u s e h o l di n
period t, rather than an individual of generation t. Taking (10) and (11) into account,








t − et)Rt+1 if bi
t ≥ et.
(12)
This shows that members who inherit a larger amount of transfer will earn higher
income. Hence, in light of (6), bi
t ≥ b
j
t for all t if bi
0 ≥ b
j
0, where i,j = S,L and i 6= j.13
I nw o r d s ,t h ei n i t i a lr a n k i n go fw e a l t ha m o n gp e o p l ei sn e v e rr e v e r s e di nt h ef u t u r e .
1.3. The Formation of Aggregate Capital
In a closed economy, the net amount of total investment equals total income minus
total expenditures. Thus,





Since people receive no income when young, the total wealth of the economy in period
t is owned by old individuals in period t, meaning
wtHt + RtKt = λSIS
t + λLIL
t . (14)

















t − et) for b
j
t <e t <b i
t,










t. Bt can be best thought of as total resources the
economy possesses in period t since they are allocated between investment in physical



















t <e t <b i
t,





13These rules apply throughout the present paper.10
Then by de￿nition, the future ratio of the two capital stocks is
kt+1 =

     






















Since individuals at time t are capable of predicting kt+1 accurately, their expectation
of kt+1 in (17) must coincides with the actual level of kt+1 in (9). In other words, kt+1
in equilibrium satis￿es both (9) and (17) for a given pair (bS
t ,b L
t ).
2.1. Existence and Uniqueness
The equilibrium condition precludes the situation max(bS
t ,b L
t ) <e t,w h i c ha p p l i e st o
the ￿rst case of (17). Namely, members of the richer group are never credit-constrained
in equilibrium. This is because, if max(bS
t ,b L
t ) <e t, there would be no savings and
kt+1 = e(kt+1)=0 , a contradiction to (bS
t ,b L




if and only if bS
t = bL
t =0 .












t,λi) and k(et;Bt,0,1) respectively correspond to the second and
third cases. λ is viewed as the number of members who are not credit-constrained. be
t
is the average level of their transfers at time t. bc
t is the average level of transfers at
time t owned by members who are credit-constrained.
k(et;be
t,b c
t,λ) is a continuous function on R3

















The properties of e(kt+1) and k(et;be
t,b c
t,λ) assure the existence of a unique kt+1
that solves et = e(kt+1) and kt+1 = k(et;be
t,b c









+ ￿ (0,1], such that (i) k(be
t,b c
t,0) = 0 ∀(be
t,b c
t) ∈ R2




t,λ) ∈ R+ ￿ (0,1], and (iii) ∂k(•)/∂be
t > 0, ∂k(•)/∂bc
t < 0 and




Figure 1. Inequality, Factor Intensity, and Education





i) and kt+1 = k(et;Bt,0,1) uniquely intersects with et = e(kt+1).
The equilibrium capital intensity, kt, and desirable educational level, et, occur at one of the two












































t ) for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ei
k(Bt,0,1) ≡ κ∗(bS
t ,b L
t ) for (bS
t ,b L
















t ) ∈ R2
+ | e(κ∗(bS
t ,b L




Note that superscript i (= S,L) of κi(bS
t ,b L
t ) indicates the richer group, and that
whether λ equals λS, λL,o r1 is determined endogenously by a pair (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
+.
Figure 1 geometrically represents the equilibrium levels of the factor intensity and
education as an intersection of either kt+1 = k(et;bi
t,b
j
t,λi) and et = e(kt+1),o rkt+1 =
k(et;Bt,0,1) and et = e(kt+1). The choice of the intersection is determined by the
ratio of transfers between the two groups, bS
t /bL
t ,a sw e l la st h e i rt o t a la m o u n t ,Bt.T h e
case in which kt+1 = κi(bS
t ,b L
t ) and the poorer members are credit-constrained occurs
if the gap between bS
t and bL
t are suﬃciently large, otherwise the other case in which
kt+1 = κ∗(bS
t ,b L
t ) and nobody is constrained would be take place. The schedule kt+1 =
k(et;Bt,0,1) is independent of the ratio bS
t /bL
t , and the same amount of Bt are used in







































2.2. The Credit Constraint Frontier
In order to understand ES, EL,a n dE∗ geometrically, we will introduce the credit
constraint frontier, CCi, on which members of group j spend the entire amount of
transfers on the desirable level of education, leaving no savings. That is,
CCi ≡ {(bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
+ | bi
t = et},
where et = e(κ(bS
t ,b L
t )).
Lemma 1. There exists a single-valued function b
j
t = ϕj(bi
t) ≥ 0 on R+ such that
(bS
t ,ϕL(bS
t )) ∈ CCS, (ϕS(bL
t ),b L
t ) ∈ CCL.F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o r(bS
t ,b L












































t,0) ≥ 0, ∂Gi(•)/∂b
j
t < 0 and limb
j
t→∞ Gi(•)=−∞ ∀bi
t ≥ 0. These prop-
erties assure the existence of a single-valued function b
j
t = ϕj(bi
t) on R+ such that
Gi(bi
t,ϕj(bi
t)) = 0.( i ) I f b
j
t > ϕj(bi







et.14 Likewise, if b
j
t < ϕj(bi
t),t h e nbi
t = e(k(λibi
t + λjϕj(bi
t),0,1)) >e (k(Bt,0,1)) = et.
(ii) ϕj(0) = 0 because Gi(0,0) = 0. dϕj(bi
t)/dbi
t is obtained from a simple calculation.














In words, whether a young individual is credit-constrained or not depends on the relative
amount of bS
t and bL
t . If one group inherits a greater amount of wealth than the other,
the desirable level of education is likely to cost more than the latter can aﬀord to pay.
The results of Lemma 1 are summarized graphically in Figure 2. EL is located above
the CCS line, ES is below the CCL line and E∗ corresponds to the region between
ES and EL.M o r e o v e r ,CCS ∪CCL = {0} and the infeasibility of the third case in (17)
gives ES∪EL∪E∗ = R2
+. Noting that the credit-constraint frontiers are the boundaries
of E∗ and the other sets, (20) assures the continuity of κ(bS
t ,b L
























Figure 2. The Credit Constraint Frontiers
Notes. The frontiers are the boundaries that divide Regimes 2 and 3.
discussion sometimes uses the inverse function of ϕi, denoted as ￿j. In the diagram,
for instance, the CCL line is expressed by both bS
t = ϕS(bL
t ) and bL
t = ￿L(bS
t ).
The discussion so far makes it clear that the economy falls under the category of one
of the following regimes.15
Regime 1: Selective human capital accumulation
Regime 2: Universal human capital accumulation under constraints
Regime 3: Universal human capital accumulation under no constraints
Figure 2 associates a pair of transfers (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
+ with the three regimes. For
analytical convenience, the origin (0,0) is de￿ned as their intersection. By noting that
the isoquant curve of Bt has a negative constant slope −λS/λL,o n ec a n￿nd that
the economy￿s regime is determined by distribution of Bt as well as the level of Bt.
The economy with a pair of transfers (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
+\R2
++ is in Regime 1 in period t,
a state where young members of one group have no resources for investment. Such
a pair can be regarded as a distribution extremelybiased toward the other group. If
(bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
++\E∗, then the economy belongs to Regime 2, where all young members
receive transfers although those in the poorer group face credit constraints. Finally, the
remaining region, E∗, corresponds to Regime 3, where Bt is most equally distributed
among the three regimes, and all individuals can aﬀord to attain the desirable level of
education.
15Regimes 1-3 in the present paper are the counterparts of Stages I-III (of Regime II) in Galor and
Moav (2001). As revealed below, the economy does not necessarily go through each stage in the process
of development. For this reason, Stages I-III are renamed as Regimes 1-3. The counterpart of their





















2.3. Inequality and Productivity
It follows from (1), (15) and (16) that aggregate output, or equivalently output per
worker, is







t ) ∈ Ei
Y (Bt,0,1) for (bS
t ,b L




t,λ) ≡ A[Bt − (1 − λ)bc
t − λet]α[(1 − λ)h(bc
t)+λh(et)]1−α. (22)
As follows from (2) and (7), et is the maximizer of the right hand side of (22), and thus
t h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e mv e r i ￿es the expression of Y (Bt,b c
t,λ).O b s e r v eYB(Bt,b c
t,λ) > 0
and YBB(Bt,b c
t,λ) < 0, ∀(Bt,b c




t,λ) ∈ R+ ￿ (0,1].




t > 0 for (bS
t ,b L




Hence the isoquant of Yt+1 exhibits convexity in the (bS
t ,b L
t ) space; it is strictly convex
to the origin in the regions ES and EL, and has a constant slope −λS/λL in region
E∗. Noting that the isoquant of Bt has a slope of −λS/λL, a great change in bS
t /bL
t not
only worsens between-group inequality but also aﬀects the level of output adversely.
Equally important,
∂Y (Bt,b c
t,λ)/∂λ > 0 for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ ES ∪ EL, (24)
meaning that the adverse eﬀect of between-group inequality in transfers on output is
more signi￿c a n tw h e nt h en u m b e ro fr i c h e rm e m b e r si ss m a l l e r .
These results re￿ect the fact that inequality lowers intertemporal productivity as a
result of the constrained investment in human capital. Since personal human capital in-
creases disproportionately with the cost of investment, concentrating resources towards
a small portion of the population reduces the aggregate level of human capital. Note
that redistribution of transfers in period t has no positive impact on physical capital
and output in period t+1. By contrast, redistribution of income in period t generates
a trade-oﬀ in period t +1between the eﬃciency in production and the abundance of
resources.
3. THE DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
This section explores the global behavior of the dynamical system that governs the
evolution of wealth inequality in the process of development. Plugging (2) and (9) into15









t − e(κi))R(κi) for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ei
w(κ∗)h(e(κ∗)) + (bi
t − e(κ∗))R(κ∗) for (bS
t ,b L












t ) and κj(bS
t ,b L
t ).
Hence, member i￿s future income is aﬀected by the current wealth level of the other
group through changes in the capital ratio. Now de￿ne a set Zi such that
Zi ≡ {(bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
+ | Ii
t+1 < θ}. (26)







    
    
β[w(κi)h(e(κi)) + (bi
t − e(κi))R(κi) − θ] for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ei\Zi
β[w(κ∗)h(e(κ∗)) + (bi
t − e(κ∗))R(κ∗) − θ] for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ E∗\Zi
β[w(κj)h(bi
t) − θ] for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ej\Zi
0 for (bS
t ,b L




At r a j e c t o r y{bS
t ,b L
t }∞
t=0 is fully determined by the dynamical system that consists
of the initial condition (bS
0,b L









and the state space R2
+. Adult individuals at time 0 grant bS
0 and bL
0 to their chil-
dren according to bi
0 = max[β(Ii
0 − θ),0] from (6). The initial income Ii
0 consists of
the earnings from the ownership of physical and human capital, and their levels and
distributions are exogenously given.
In order to simplify the following analysis of the dynamical system, we assume com-
plete capital depreciation, δ =1 ,s ot h a tRt = rt.16 The stock variable Ii
t is then
reduced to a ￿ow variable, the income obtained in period t.
3.1. The BB Locus
In order to fully understand the dynamics of transfers, it is necessary to characterize
the BBS and BBL loci. BBi is de￿ned as all pairs of (bS
t ,b L
t ) for which bi
t+1 = bi








16Assuming δ ∈ [0,1) would not alter any qualitative properties of the dynamcal system.16
As is established in (27), the domain of the function ψi(bS
t ,b L
t ) is divided into E∗, Ei,
Ej and Zi, depending on the relative amount of bS
t to bL
t , as well as their total amount.
The following discussion characterizes BBi and the dynamics of transfers in each of
these four sets.
It would be plausible to assume that a nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equi-
librium exists when all members are free from credit constraints. This situation occurs
if the technology is advanced enough to satisfy
A>A (α,β,θ), (29)
where A(α,β,θ) is a continuous single-valued function.17
3.1.1. (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ei\Zi ￿ Distribution Biased to the Group Itself. First, consider the
dynamics of bi
t when resource distribution is biased toward group i. In light of (27),
de￿ne
φR(bi
t,κi) ≡ β[w(κi)h(e(κi)) + (bi
t − e(κi))R(κi) − θ] ≡ ψRi(bS
t ,b L
t ), (30)







t ) ∈ R2






t ) ∈ Ei\Zi.O n e c a n ￿nd φR
κ(bi
t,κi) < 0 by noting that et is the maximizer of
Ii
t+1, as shown in (7), and that bi
t − et = Kt+1/λi from (15). Thus, an increase in b
j
t
raises richer members￿ transfer bi
t+1 by reducing the capital ratio.
Lemma 2. Let b(λ) ≡ {bi





≡ minb(1) and ﬂ b ≡
maxb(1). Under (29),
i. {0} / ∈ b(λ) for all λ ∈ (0,1];
ii. b(1) = {b
ﬂ
,ﬂ b}.
Proof. (i) The result follows from φR(0,k(0,0,λ)) = −βθ < 0. (ii) If λ =1 , only group
i exists and thus Ii
t+1 = Yt+1. Then (22) yields φR(bi
t,k(bi
t,0,1)) = β[Y (bi
t,0,1) − θ],
and the properties of Y (bi
t,0,1) shown earlier establish the result.
As will become evident, the following lemma shows that the smaller the number of
the rich, the more wealth their oﬀspring inherit in a steady state.
Lemma 3. Under (29), b
ﬂ
(λ) ≡ max{b(λ)∩ [0,ﬂ b)} and ﬂ b(λ) ≡ min{b(λ) ∩ (b
ﬂ
,∞)} are




, ﬂ b(1) = ﬂ b, b
ﬂ
0(λ) > 0 and
ﬂ b0(λ) < 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,1].
Proof. Using φR
κ(bi







t→∞ R(κi)=0 .S i n c e kλ(bi
t,0,λ) > 0 and ψRi(0,0) < 0 as shown earlier, the
results follow except for the continuity. For the continuity of ﬂ b(λ), it is enough to prove
17A(α,β,θ) is a level of A that guarantees a unique, nontrivial, steady-state equilibrium of the au-
tonomous system bt+1 = β[Y (bt,0,1) − θ].17
that βR(k(ﬂ b(λ),0,λ)) ≤ 1, ∀λ ∈ (0,1].S i n c e ﬂ b is a steady-state value higher than b
ﬂ
,
βR(k(ﬂ b(1),0,1)) < 1. Then the result follows from
dk(ﬂ b(λ),0,λ))/dλ =





∀λ ∈ (0,1]. The continuity of b
ﬂ





(λi), ﬂ bi ≡ ﬂ b(λi),b i ≡ b(λi), bi
min ≡ minbi and bi
max ≡ maxbi. Then Lemma






< ﬂ b<ﬂ bi ≤ bi
max.
Also, ﬂ bL ≤ ﬂ bS follows from λS ≤ λL.
Corollary 1. (a) If h000(e) ≥ 0 ∀e>0,t h e ne00(kt+1) < 0 ∀kt+1 > 0; (b) If e00(kt+1) ≤
0 ∀kt+1 > 0,t h e nb(λ)={b
ﬂ
(λ),ﬂ b(λ)}.
Proof. (a) Follows from e0(kt+1)=−h0(e(kt+1))/[kt+1h00(e(kt+1))]. (b) Follows from the
fact that ψRi(bS
t ,b L
t ) is strictly concave in bi
t under the condition.
It would be reasonable to suppose that the desirable level of education exhibits a
concave reaction to the factor ratio, and this condition greatly simpli￿es the exposition
of the following lemma. Recall that ￿j stands for the inverse function of ϕi.




t) ≥ 0 on R++\(b
ﬂ
i,ﬂ bi) such that
i. ξj(bi
t)=￿j(bi
t) if and only if bi
t = bi
a or bi




b ∈ (ﬂ b,∞),
dξj(bi
a)/dbi



























Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 depicts the properties of the function ξL(bS
t ). Note that (bS
t ,ξL(bS
t )) / ∈
ES ∩ ZS because ψRS(bS
t ,ξL(bS
t )) = bS
t ≥ 0. It thus follows from (32) that any pair
(bS
t ,ξL(bS
t )) ∈ ES is an element of the BBS locus, as indicated by the solid black lines.
The slope of ξL(bS




b at point a and b respectively.
Without the concavity of e(kt+1),i tm i g h tb et h ec a s et h a tﬂ bi 6= bi
min or ﬂ bi 6= bi
max and
that some discrete sets, on which ξj(bi
t) does not exist, emerge on the interval [ﬂ bi,b i
max]
or [ﬂ bi,b i
min]. Nevertheless, the basic results of the present paper can be maintained, as
will be shown later.18
Figure 3. Discrete Portions of the BB
S Locus (a)
Notes. The solid black lines featured are part of the BB
S locus. The lines ξ
L(b
S















t in the others.
3.1.2. (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ E∗\Zi ￿ Egalitarian Distribution. We next describe the BBi locus
that belongs to E∗\Zi, where resources are distributed in a relatively equal fashion. In
light of (27), we de￿ne
φ∗(bi
t,κ∗) ≡ β[w(κ∗)h(e(κ∗)) + (bi
t − e(κ∗))R(κ∗) − θ] ≡ ψ∗i(bS
t ,b L
t ), (33)
where κ∗ = κ∗(bS
t ,b L
t ).T h e nbi
t+1 = ψ∗i(bS
t ,b L
t ) for (bS
t ,b L












t+1 = Yt+1 = Y (bi
t,0,1) from (21) and (39), noting
(bi
t,b i
t) ∈ E∗.T h u s ( 6 ) y i e l d s t h e ￿rst equality. The second equality is shown in the
p r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
This lemma is quite meaningful. The evolution of transfers starting with bS
0 = bL
0 is
now expressed by the system bi
t+1 = φR(bi
t,k(bi





) and (ﬂ b,ﬂ b), are in fact the steady-state values for Regime 3.
Lemma 6. Under condition (29), there exists a continuous function b
j
t = ζj(bi
t) R 0 on
R+\(b
ﬂ




or ﬂ b,t h e nζj(bi











or ﬂ b, ζj(bi
























































t ) <b S
t19
Figure 4. Discrete Portions of the BB
S Locus (b)
Notes. The solid black lines featured are part of the BB
S locus. The lines ζ
L(b
S















t in the others. ξ
L(b
S













b ∈ (ﬂ b,∞),w h e r e
dζj(bi
a)/dbi



























Proof. See the Appendix.




) such that ϕj(bi
t)=ζj(bi






) and (ﬂ b,ﬂ b) are the bifurcation points, and the slope of ζ(bS
t ) is vertical
at these points. Note that (bS
t ,ζL(bS
t )) / ∈ E∗ ∩ ZS because ψ∗S(bS
t ,ζL(bS
t )) = bS
t ≥ 0.
Therefore, any pair (bS
t ,ζL(bS
t )) ∈ E∗ is an element of the BBS locus, as illustrated by
the solid black lines. bS
t = bS
a and bS









t ) on CCL.T h u s ,i fζ(bS
t ) were to
be depicted in the ￿gure, ξL(bS
t ) and ζL(bS
t ) would coincide at points a and b.
3.1.3. (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ej\Zi ￿ Distribution Biased to the Other Group. Thirdly, consider
the dynamics of bi





t )) ≡ β[w(κj(bS
t ,b L
t ))h(bi








































Figure 5. A Discrete Portion of the BB
S Locus (c)
Notes. The solid black line featured is part of the BB
S locus. The line ς
L(b
S
t ) divides the space into

























t ) ∈ R2
+.T h e nbi
t+1 = ψPi(bS
t ,b L
t ) for (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Ej\Zi.












ii. There exists a value of bi
























Proof. i i . L e m m a6i m p l i e st h a tbi
t = ψ∗i(bS
t ,b L
t ) if b
j
t = ζj(bi
t), and that there exists
a value of bi
t such that ζj(bi
t)=ϕj(bi















t).T h i s
establishes the result. See the Appendix for the other parts.
Let ￿ bj ≡ ςj(0);t h a ti s ,w(k(￿ bj,0,λj)) = θ. ￿ bj is a critical level for universal human
capital accumulation. If members of group j, the rich, bequeath wealth more than ￿ bj,
the resultant high wage level induces members of group i, the unskilled, to transfer
wealth to their oﬀspring. Figure 5 depicts the properties of the function ςL(bS
t ) and
indicates ￿ bL. Note that (bS
t ,ςL(bS
t )) / ∈ EL ∩ ZS because ψPS(bS
t ,ςL(bS
t )) = bS
t ≥ 0.
Therefore, any pair (bS
t ,ςL(bS
t )) ∈ EL is an element of the BBS locus, as illustrated by
the solid black line. The slope of ςL(bS


























t ) on CCS.T h u s ,i fζ(bS
t ) were to be
represented in the diagram, ςL(bS
t ) and ζL(bS
t ) would coincide on CCS.
Lemma 8. There exists a continuous single-valued function ￿ b(λ) > 0 on (0,1] such that
w(k(￿ b(λ),0,λ)) = θ and ￿ b0(λ) < 0 ∀λ ∈ (0,1].
Proof. Noting (2),w ed e ￿ne
Q(b,λ) ≡ A[k(b,0,λ)]α − θ/(1 − α).
The properties of k(•) assert that Qb(b,λ) > 0 ∀(b,λ) ∈ R++￿(0,1],a n dt h a tQ(0,λ) <
0 and limb→∞ Q(b,λ)=∞∀ λ ∈ (0,1]. Then there exists a single-valued function￿ b(λ) >
0 such that Q(￿ b(λ),λ)=0 . ￿ b0(λ) < 0 follows from Qλ(b,λ) > 0 ∀(b,λ) ∈ R++ ￿ (0,1].
As follows from the above lemma, we get ￿ bj = ￿ b(λj) and ￿ bL ≤ ￿ bS.
The property ￿ b0(λ) < 0 can be thought of in the following manner. An increase in
the richer group￿s transfer raises the capital-skill ratio and thus the wage level, wt+1.
H e n c eas m a l l e rn u m b e ro fr i c h e rm e m b e r si ns o c i e t yr e q u i r e se a c ho ft h e mt os a v ea
greater amount of transfers, b
j
t, in order to obtain wt+1 = θ.
One can easily demonstrate that A and α respectively have negative and positive
correlations with ￿ b(λ). Due to the complementarity between technology and skill, a
more productive technology increases the wage for a given kt+1 and thus reduces ￿ b(λ)
for all λ. An increase in α, the capital share, implies a greater dependance of production
on physical capital, and human capital becomes less important in production. The wage
level then declines for a given kt+1, and accordingly a higher level of bt is required to
satisfy wt+1 = θ. As α approaches 1, wt+1 goes to zero and therefore ￿ b(λ) must go to
in￿nity for all λ.
3.1.4. (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Zi ￿ Absolute Poverty. We are now in a position to describe the
BBi locus for the fourth (and ￿nal) case, (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Zi.T h i si st h es i t u a t i o ni nw h i c h






< 0 if (bS
t ,b L








Figure 6 constructs the entire BBS locus by combining Figures 4-5. Once the set Zi
is characterized, the direction of the motion of bi
t can be described by using (34), (32),






t ) ∈ Zi ∩ BBi if and only if bi
t =0and b
j
t ∈ [0,￿ bj).22
Figure 6. The Dynamics of b
S
t






















points a and b respectively.
Proof. Suﬃciency: Suppose (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ Zi ∩ BBi.B y d e ￿nition, Ii
t+1 < θ and bi
t+1 =
bi
t. Since (6) yields bi




t,0,λj)) < θ.T h e n
∂k(•)/∂b
j
t > 0 shows b
j




t ∈ [0,￿ bj).T h e nIi
t+1 = w(k(b
j
t,0,λj)) < θ, meaning
bi
t+1 =0 . Hence (bS
t ,b L




t > 0 for all bi
t > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The two lemmas reveal that, in Figure 6, the dotted line on which IS
t+1 = θ exists
between the bL




),a n dZS appears on the
left-hand side of the dotted line. Accordingly, one can indicate the directions of bS
t by
the short arrows and can use the long arrows to show that bS
t+1 jumps to zero. Further
characterizations of Zi provide no additional information on the qualitative nature of
the dynamical system and one can neglect them without loss of generality.
3.3. Global Dynamics
The previous results enable us to analyze the global dynamic behavior of trans-
fers. By utilizing the phase diagrams, we demonstrate that the initial distribution of























performances. To conduct the analysis, it would be reasonable to assume
lim
λ→0
k(ﬂ b(λ),0,λ) ≤ ￿ k<k (ﬂ b,0,1), (38)
where ￿ k ≡ w−1(θ)=[ θ/(1−α)A]1/α, ﬂ b = ﬂ b(1),a n dk(ﬂ b(λ),0,λ) is strictly increasing in
λ as follows from (31). The assumption is feasible because ﬂ b(λ) and thus k(ﬂ b(λ),0,λ)
increase with A for all λ ∈ (0,1]. The ￿rst inequality in (38) states that the technology
is not productive enough to nullify the role of distribution; if the inequality is violated,
parental transfers eventually occur in all households regardless of their initial asset
holdings. The second inequality states that unskilled workers who own no assets would
transfer wealth to their oﬀspring if they were in the higher-level steady state in Regime
3.
It will become apparent that the magnitude of the gap between ﬂ bi ≡ ﬂ b(λi) and
￿ bi ≡ ￿ b(λi) changes the nature of the dynamical system.





> 1 for λ ∈ (0,λ◦)
=1 for λ = λ◦
< 1 for λ ∈ (λ◦,1].
Proof. By noting ￿ k = k(￿ b(λ),0,λ), (38) assures the existence of a λ such that ￿ b(λ)=
ﬂ b(λ). The other results follow from ￿ b0(λ) < ﬂ b0(λ) < 0 if ￿ b(λ)=ﬂ b(λ),w h i c hi ss h o w nb y
simple calculations.
Remark 1. By noting λS =1− λL < 0.5, the corollary rules out the simultaneous
occurrence of ￿ bS/ﬂ bS < 1 and ￿ bL/ﬂ bL ≥ 1.
Among several possible cases, ￿rst consider ￿ bS ≥ ﬂ bS and ￿ bL < ﬂ bL as a benchmark.
Figure 7 illustrates the global behavior of the dynamical system. The diagram is the
result of the combination of Figure 6, which features group S, and the hypothetical
￿gure which features group L. S u c hac o m b i n a t i o ni sf o r m e db ym e a n so ft h r e es i m -
pli￿cations. First, the diagram omits the range of absolute poverty, ZS ∪ ZL,o nt h e
grounds that the omission does not aﬀect the direction of motion of transfers, as shown
in Figure 6. Second, the BB locus is drawn to be gradual, and this way of drawing
rules out some steady states that otherwise would exist. Third, we assume the strict
concavity of e(•) so that some potential steady states are neglected, as discussed previ-
ously. It will be clear that the qualitative nature of the system is robust to alternative
assumptions.
Steady-state equilibria occur at the intersections of BBS and BBL.A m o n g t h e m ,
(0,0),(ﬂ bS,0),a n d(ﬂ b,ﬂ b) are locally stable, whereas all the others are unstable. The sys-
tem therefore exhibits the multiplicity of nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equi-
libria, implying that the distribution of transfers determines the steady-state point to
which the economy converges. Observe that steady-state equilibrium does not occur24
Figure 7. The Joint Evolution of Transfers (￿ b
S ≥ ﬂ b
S and ￿ b
L < ﬂ b
L)













b at c and d respectively. The system exhibits
multiplicity of locally stable steady-state equilibria.
at (0,ﬂ bL). Also, note that the transitional behavior of bi
t is not necessarily monotonic,
and that the economy enter may enter Regime 2 from Regime 3.
It is worth while mentioning that the diagram illustrates the growth path proposed





0 =0 . Hence the initial state is Regime 1 where bL
t increases over
time and members in group S remain uneducated. When bL
t exceeds ￿ bL, the economy
enters Regime 2 and the level of bS
t begins to ascend. At this stage, members in group S
receive education in the presence of liquidity constraints. The economy ￿nally reaches
Regime 3 where the constraints are no longer binding, converging towards (ﬂ b,ﬂ b).







ﬂ b<ﬂ bL < ﬂ bS, which holds independently of the ratio ￿ bi/ﬂ bi. In light of Figure 7, the
property ﬂ b<ﬂ bL < ﬂ bS implies that unequal distribution is bene￿cial for members of
group S in the long run, as well as in the short run. However, it is proven below that
unequal distribution is undesirable for the long-run performance of economic growth.
Proposition 1. Under (29), λiﬂ bi < ﬂ b and Y (λiﬂ bi,0,λi) <Y(ﬂ b,0,1). That is to say,
the egalitarian steady-state pair, (ﬂ b,ﬂ b), generates higher levels of aggregate transfers and
output than the non-egalitarian steady-state pairs, (ﬂ bS,0) and (0,ﬂ bL).
Proof. Consider Figure 7, where ζj(ﬂ b)=ﬂ b and ζj(bi
t) is vertically sloped at bi
t = ﬂ b,a s

















S ﬂ bS ￿ bS











the use of (59) and (63) in the Appendix establishes
dζj(bi
t)/dbi





Combining these results reveals that in the (bi
t,b
j
t) space, (ﬂ b,ﬂ b) is the unique intersection
of ζj(bi
t) and the isoquant for Bt = ﬂ b, whose slope is −λi/λj. Hence λibi
b+λjζj(bi
b) < ﬂ b.
Since Lemma 4 shows that all elements of bi must be between bi
a and bi
b,w en o w￿nd
λiﬂ bi < λibi
b < ﬂ b. The second result thus follows from (23).
The proposition requires condition (29) merely for the existence of the steady-state
equilibria. To grasp the implication of the proposition, suppose that society is endowed
with a suﬃc i e n ta m o u n to fw e a l t hB0 ∈ (b
ﬂ
,λSﬂ bS]. It then follows from the proposition
that the economy ends up stagnating in Regime 1 if all resources are owned by members
of group S. Transfers in this case converge to (ﬂ bS,0) and members of group L remain
unskilled in all subsequent periods. Inequality hence hampers the onset of universal
human capital accumulation and the process of development. On the other hand, under
more equal distribution such as bS
0 =0and bL
0 > 0, the wage income eventually exceeds
the critical level θ and the economy evolves toward the egalitarian steady state with
higher aggregate transfers and output. Note that the economy does not even go through












]. Now one can see that egalitarian distributions may result in the recession
toward no resources, (0,0), as all people would spend a large fraction of their wealth
on consumption and education. While positive amounts of output are sustained in
unequal society, high inequality tends to lead the economy to either (ﬂ bS,0) or (0,ﬂ bL),
rather than the egalitarian steady-state equilibrium, (ﬂ b,ﬂ b).
To summarize, high inequality lowers the growth performance of wealthy countries in
the long run, whereas it would prevent less developed countries from degenerating. This
￿nding is in correlation with recent studies that employ the capital market imperfection
approach in the literature on inequality and growth.
Now turn to the second possible case, ￿ bS ≥ ﬂ bS and ￿ bL ≥ ﬂ bL.U n l i k e(0,ﬂ bL) in Figure
7, a locally stable steady-state equilibrium occurs at (0,ﬂ bL) in this case. Although the
long-run performance of the economy is more sensitive to the initial distribution than
in the benchmark case, one can ￿nd the qualitatively same eﬀect of distribution, which
depends on the scarcity of initial resources.
For the last case, ￿ bS < ﬂ bS and ￿ bL < ﬂ bL,n e i t h e r(ﬂ bS,0) nor (0,ﬂ bL) is a steady-state
equilibrium. Hence, the role of distribution becomes less important; regardless of the
initial distribution, any economy endowed with B0 >b
ﬂ
converges to the egalitarian
steady-state equilibrium, (ﬂ b,ﬂ b).
3.4. Redistribution and Welfare
Consider now redistribution of wealth, B0, by controlling λS as well as bS
0.A f e w
remarks deserve to be made at this point. First, by de￿nition, λL and bL
0 are uniquely26
determined for a given set of λS, bS
0 and B0. Second, the degree of inequality is changed
by the relative size of the two groups as well as the distribution of wealth across the
two groups. With a small value of λS, one can execute more drastic redistribution of
w e a l t h ;d i s t r i b u t i o nb i a s e dt o w a r dg r o u pS allots the small fraction of population the
large portion of national wealth, generating high inequality. Third, and ￿nally, changing
the group size aﬀects the ratio￿ bS/ﬂ bS and ￿ bL/ﬂ bL and the nature of the dynamical system.
If a suﬃciently small level of λS is chosen, Lemma 11 suggests that the system is
characterized by the benchmark case presented previously, and the remaining cases do
not take place. It is shown that the initial distribution of wealth determines the econ-
omy￿s long-run performance when the amount of wealth is neither extremely abundant
nor scarce: B0 ∈ (λSb
ﬂ
S,λSﬂ bS]. Recall that the egalitarian steady-state level (ﬂ b,ﬂ b) is
independent of the choice of λS.
On the other hand, if moderate redistribution is executed by choosing a suﬃciently
large level of λS, λS/λL approaches one, and the heterogeneity across the two groups
generates the dynamical system characterized by either of the last two cases. However,
the last case, ￿ bS < ﬂ bS and ￿ bL < ﬂ bL, may not occur under (38). The feasibility of the
last case is assured under a stronger condition on the structural parameters, such as a
higher level of A.
The discussion in Subsections 3.3-3.4 can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. Under (38), highly unequal distribution of initial wealth is desirable from
the viewpoint of the richer members and their oﬀspring, but not from the long-term
viewpoint of society.
4. OUTPUT GROWTH
The preceding analysis has fully revealed the process of economic development in terms
of intergenerational transfers. By considering the underlying evolution of output, one
can examine the impact of initial wealth distribution on the behavior of output growth.
This section uses subscripts i and j, where i,j = S,L and i 6= j,t oi n d i c a t et h e
richer and poorer groups, respectively. It is assumed that income distribution at time
0 is highly unequal in the absence of redistribution. More accurately, hi
0 = h(e(k0))
and adult individuals of group j initially possess neither advanced skills nor physical
capital.
4.1. Aggregate Transfers
At the outset, consider the economy is in Regimes 2 or 3 in period t, (bS
t ,b L
t ) ∈ R2
++.
As follows from (1), (2) and (14),





t ) ￿ 0 or (bS
t ,b L
t )=( 0 ,0) is the case in both Regimes, (6) and (39)
prove that aggregate transfers in Regimes 2 and 3 are
Bt = max[β(Yt − θ),0]. (40)
Next suppose that the economy is in Regime 1 in period t−1. Then skilled workers
with human capital h(e(kt)) are a fraction λi of adult individuals in period t,a n d
unskilled workers are 1−λi of adult individuals in period t. Noting h
j
t = h(0) = 1, the
output in period t is
Yt = Akα
t [λih(e(kt)) + 1 − λi].
Given the properties of e(kt) and h(kt), there exists a unique kt for a given pair (Yt,λi).
It follows that
kt = κ(Yt,λi),
where κ(Yt,λ) is a single-valued function on R+￿(0,1] such that κ(0,λ)=0 , limYt→∞ κ(Yt,λ)=
∞∀ λ > 0,a n dκY (Yt,λ) > 0 and κλ(Yt,λ) < 0 ∀(Yt,λ) ∈ R++ ￿ (0,1].18 Then the
wage rate can be written as wt = w(κ(Yt,λ)) ≡ ω(Yt,λ), which preserves the above
properties of κ(Yt,λ).19 Unskilled workers (the poorer members) receive I
j
t = ω(Yt,λi),
and as follows from (39), skilled workers receive
Ii
t =[ Yt − λjω(Yt,λi)]/λi = ω(Yt,λi)h(e(κ(Yt,λi))) + αYt/λi, (41)
where αYt is the return on savings, RtKt,n o t i n g( 1) and (2). Hence, all workers￿
incomes strictly monotonically increase with output, and will be zero if no output is
produced.
Corollary 2. There exist single-valued functions ø Y (λ) and ￿ Y (λ) on λ ∈ (0,1] such
that
[ø Y (λ) − (1 − λ)ω(ø Y (λ),λ)]/λ = ω(￿ Y (λ),λ)=θ. (42)
Furthermore, noting (41),
i. ø Y 0(λ) > 0 and ￿ Y 0(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ (0,1];
ii. limλ→0 ø Y =0and ø Y (1) = θ;
iii. ø Y (λ) < ￿ Y (λ) for all λ ∈ (0,1];
iv. ￿ Y i ≡ ￿ Y (λi)=Y (λi￿ bi,0,λi).
ø Y (λ) and ￿ Y (λ) are respectively the minimum levels of output that induce skilled
workers who own assets and unskilled workers to transfer wealth to their oﬀspring at
time t.
The last property of Corollary 2 suggests that b
j




t−1 =0 . Under these conditions, unskilled workers transfer no wealth to
their oﬀspring in period t and the economy is in Regime 1 in both periods t and t− 1.
18For reasons that will be clear shortly, κ(Yt,λ) is de￿ned on R+ ￿ (0,1] rather than R+ ￿ (0,1).
19By construction, ω(Yt,1) does not describe the wage rate in Regime 2.28
Substituting for Ii
t from (41)i n t o( 6 )f o rR e g i m e1 and recalling (40) for Regimes 2 and
















0 if Yt ∈ [0, ø Y (λ)]
β[Yt − (1 − λ)ω(Yt,λ) − λθ] if Yt ≥ ø Y (λ).
(44)
Note that ø Y (1) = θ as shown in Corollary 2 and BY (Yt,λ) > 0 as follows from (41).





< 0 for Yt ∈ (ø Y (λ), ￿ Y (λ))
=0 for Yt = ￿ Y (λ)
> 0 for Yt > ￿ Y (λ);
BλY (Yt,λ) > 0,
for all (Yt,λ) ∈ R++ ￿ (0,1].T h e￿rst property suggests that the inequality generated
by a small fraction of the rich stimulates resource accumulation in the early stages of
development, and the qualitative eﬀect is reversed at Y = ￿ Y , the critical level dividing
Regimes 1 and 2.20 T h es e c o n dp r o p e r t yi m p l i e st h a tt h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of inequality
on aggregate transfers is more conductive at lower levels of development.
4.2. The Evolution of Output within Regimes
We may now proceed to the description of the evolution of output in each regime.
Substitution for Bt from (43) into (21) establishes

















t ) ∈ Ei ∩ R2
++
Y (B(Yt,1),0,1) ≡ Φ3(Yt) if (bS
t ,b L




t,λ) ≡ A[Bt − (1 − λ)bc
t − λet]α[(1 − λ)h(bc
t)+λh(et)]1−α.
Φ1i(Yt) hence determines the output at time t +1on the condition that the economy
remain in Regime 1 for the previous two periods.
(45) shows that one can identify the economy￿s current regime not from the current
level of output but from the levels of transfers. In order to visualize the entire evolu-




20Without the concavity of e(k), Bλ(Yt,λ)=0may not occur at a unique level of Yt,a n dBλY (Y,λ) > 0
may not hold on the entire domain.29
4.2.1.R e g i m e 1 and Regime 3. First consider the evolution of output in Regimes 1 and
3. It is convenient to de￿ne
Φ(Yt,λ) ≡ A[B(Yt,λ) − λet]α[1 − λ + λh(et)]1−α




=0 for Yt ≤ ø Y (λ)
> 0 for Yt > ø Y (λ);
ΦY (Yt,λ)=R(kt+1)BY (Yt,λ) > 0, (46)
for all (Yt,λ) ∈ (ø Y (λ),∞)￿(0,1],a n dt h es e c o n dd e r i v a t i v ei sn e g a t i v ef o rλ =1 .21 As
will become apparent, Φλ(Yt,λ),t h ee ﬀect of equality, is negative at lower levels of Yt
and the sign is reversed at higher levels of Yt. The use of (18) yields the capital-skill
ratio
kt+1 = k(Bt/λ,0,λ)=k(B(Yt,λ)/λ,0,λ), (47)







The last property stems from the fact that individuals￿ investment in human capital is
subject to diminishing marginal returns.
Lemma 12. Under (15), ∀λ ∈ (0,1],
i. Y = Φ(Y,λ) > 0 if and only if Y = Y (λb(λ),0,λ), where b(λ) ∈ b(λ).
ii. ΦY (Y
ﬂ
(λ),λ) > 1, ΦY (ﬂ Y (λ),λ) < 1 and Yt < Φ(Yt,λ) ∀Yt ∈ (Y
ﬂ
(λ), ﬂ Y (λ)),w h e r e
Y
ﬂ
(λ) ≡ Y (λb
ﬂ
(λ),0,λ) and ﬂ Y (λ) ≡ Y (λﬂ b(λ),0,λ).
Proof. i. A value of Y that satis￿es Y = Φ(Y,λ) can be thought of as a steady-state
level of output conditional on bc
t =0∀t.S i n c e b(λ) is the steady-state level of the
transfer conditional on bc
t =0∀t, Y must coincide with Y (λb(λ),0,λ).




t,0,λ)) is unstable at b
ﬂ
(λ) and stable at ﬂ b(λ). Hence part i establishes the
result.
The ￿r s tr e s u l ti sn o tt os a yt h a tY (λb(λ),0,λ) is necessarily a steady-state level of
output. The second result asserts that there is no steady-state level of output on the
interval (Y
ﬂ
i, ﬂ Y i). To understand the ￿rst point, note that
￿ bi Q ﬂ bi if and only if ￿ Y i Q ﬂ Y i, (48)
where ￿ bi ≡ ￿ b(λi), ﬂ bi ≡ ﬂ b(λi), ￿ Y i ≡ ￿ Y (λi) and ﬂ Y i ≡ ﬂ Y (λi). Therefore, ﬂ Y i is not a
steady-state level of output when ￿ bi < ﬂ bi,a ss h o w nb y￿ bL < ﬂ bL in Figure 7. Conversely,
21If e
00(k) ≤ 0 ∀k>0, ΦYY(Yt,λ) < 0 and ΦY λ(Yt,λ) > 0 ∀(Yt,λ) ∈ (θ,∞) ￿ (0,1].30
Figure 8. The Evolution of Output in Regimes 1 and 3 (ﬂ Y
S ≤ ￿ Y
S)
Notes. There exists a locally stable steady-state equilibrium in each of Regimes 1 a n d3 .I nt h ee a r l y
stages of development, the economy starting in Regime 1 produces higher output than the economy
starting in Regime 3. However, the former economy is unable to take oﬀ from Regime 1 to Regime 2,
converging to the lower-level steady state where Yt = ﬂ Y
S.
if ￿ bi ≥ ﬂ bi, which corresponds to ￿ bS ≥ ﬂ bS in Figure 7, ﬂ Y i is a nontrivial, locally stable,
steady-state equilibrium that occurs in Regime 1.




(1) are steady-state levels of transfers in




,0,1) and ﬂ Y ≡ Y (ﬂ b,0,1) are the
corresponding steady-state levels of output. It should be noted that, by de￿nition, Y
ﬂ
and ﬂ Y are independent of the fraction of richer members, λi; i.e., ∂Y
ﬂ
/∂λi = ∂ﬂ Y/ ∂λi =
0.
Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of output in Regime 1 a n dR e g i m e3f o rt h es m a l l
fraction of richer members, ￿ Y S ≥ ﬂ Y S. As follows from Lemma 11, for a set of param-
eters that satisfy condition (38), ￿ Y S ≥ ﬂ Y S whenever ￿ Y L ≥ ﬂ Y L, yet the reverse is not
true. For this reason, we treat ￿ Y S ≥ ﬂ Y S as a general case.
In the diagram, Y
ﬂ




S ≡ Y (λSb
ﬂ
S,0,λS),
and it is assumed that b(λS)={b
ﬂ
S,ﬂ bS} for the simplicity of the exposition. One can
see the function Φ1S(Yt) crossing the 45◦ line at Y
ﬂ
S and ﬂ Y S,a n dt h ef u n c t i o nΦ3(Yt)
crossing the 45◦ line at Y
ﬂ









In addition, ﬂ Y S < ﬂ Y follows from Proposition 1.
Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of output in Regime 1 and Regime 3 for the large
f r a c t i o no ft h er i c h ,￿ Y L < ﬂ Y L. Unlike ﬂ Y S in Figure 8, ﬂ Y L is not a steady-state level of
output and the economy starting in Regime 1 automatically enters Regime 2.
4.2.2. Regime 2 and Regime 3. We are now in a position to examine the evolution
of output in Regimes 2 and 3. One can ￿nd that Φ2i(Yt,b
j
t) and Φ3(Yt) exhibits the
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Figure 9. The Evolution of Output in Regimes 1 and 3 (￿ Y
L < ﬂ Y
L)
Notes. Unlike ﬂ Y
S in Figure 8, ﬂ Y
L is not a steady-state level of output. The economy starting in Regime
1 can take oﬀ from Regime 1 to Regime 2, converging to the steady state where Yt = ﬂ Y .
as presented in (45). Φ2i(Yt,b
j
t) is hence strictly monotonically increasing and strictly
concave in Yt.
Recall that credit constraints are binding in the poorer group in Regime 2, whereas
all individuals are free from the constraints and spend et in Regime 3. Since et is the
optimal level of education to maximize the output at time t +1 , Φ2i(Yt,b
j
t) is smaller
than Φ3(Yt) when b
j
t,w h i c hi sbc
t,d o e sn o tc o i n c i d ew i t het.T h a ti s ,
Φ2i(Yt,b
j
t)=Φ3(Yt) if Yt ≤ θ or Yt = Y cc,
Φ2i(Yt,b
j
t) < Φ3(Yt) othewise,
(49)
where Y cc is a value such that
b
j
t = et = e(k(Bt,0,1)) = e(k(B(Y cc,1),0,1))
by using (20). Hence Y cc is a continuous function Y cc(b
j
t) on R+ such that Y cc(0) =
[0,θ], Y cc(b
j
t) > θ and Y cc0(b
j
t) > 0 for b
j
t > 0.S i n c e∂Φ2i(Yt,b
j





t) a n da ni n c r e a s ei nλi, the fraction of the richer members, narrows the gap
between Φ2i(Yt,b) and Φ3(Yt). The result (49) implies that Φ3(Yt) is the envelope curve
of Φ2i(Yt,b), where b is constant and greater than zero. As illustrated in Figure 10, the
fact that e(kt+1) increases with Yt while b is constant creates a discrepancy between
e(kt+1) and b.G i v e nt h a tY cc0(b) > 0, an increase in b shifts Φ2i(Yt,b) gradually to the
left along the envelope curve Φ3(Yt).
4.3. The Short-Run Eﬀect of Inequality
We now examine how a change in λ, the fraction of people who are not credit-











Y ◦ ﬂ Y L ﬂ Y ￿ Y L32
Figure 10. The Evolution of Output in Regimes 2 and 3
Notes.T h e￿gure depicts the conditional dynamics for Regime 2, Yt+1 = Φ
2i(Yt,b), and the uncondi-
tional dynamics for Regime 3, Yt+1 = Φ
3(Yt). b<e t if and only if Yt >Y
cc.
Lemma 13. ∀(λ,λ0) ∈ (0,1) ￿ (λ,1],
Φ(Yt,λ) − Φ(Yt,λ0)
(
> 0 for Yt ∈ (ø Y (λ), ø Y (λ0)]
< 0 for Yt ≥ ￿ Y (λ).
Proof. The ￿rst result follows from (46) and ø Y (λ) < ø Y (λ0). For the second result,
observe
B(Yt,λ0) − B(Yt,λ)=β[(1 − λ)ω(Yt,λ) − (1 − λ0)ω(Yt,λ0) − (λ0 − λ)θ],
where, noting ω(Yt,λ0) < ω(Yt,λ),
(1 − λ)ω(Yt,λ) − (1 − λ0)ω(Yt,λ0) > (λ0 − λ)ω(Yt,λ).
Since ω(Yt,λ) ≥ θ ∀Yt ≥ ￿ Y (λ),w e￿nd that B(Yt,λ0)−B(Yt,λ) ≥ 0 ∀Yt ≥ ￿ Y (λ).T h e n
the result follows from Yλ(Bt,0,λ) > 0 ∀(Bt,λ) ∈ R++ ￿ (0,1].
The above results are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, where they intersect each other
at Y e.S i n c eΦY (Yt,λ) < ΦY (Yt,1) for (Yt,λ) ∈ (θ,∞) ￿ (0,1],L e m m a13 implies the
uniqueness of Y ◦.22
Corollary 3. If ￿ Y i ≤ ﬂ Y i,t h e nY
ﬂ
<Y◦ < ﬂ Y i.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13a n dt h a tY
ﬂ









<Y◦ < ﬂ Y i < ﬂ Y if ￿ Y i ≤ ﬂ Y i.
One can view the distance Φ1i(Yt)−Φ3(Yt) as the impact of inequality on Yt+1 at a
given level of Yt or, to put it another way, at a given stage of development. Furthermore,
as long as the economy on each path remains in its initial regime, the discrepancy in
the subsequent growth paths of output tells us the impact of the redistribution on the
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growth process. Redistribution can be executed in a more drastic fashion by choosing
a smaller number of the rich, λi.
Since intergenerational transfers are a luxury good, poorer households leave no wealth
to their oﬀspring at underdeveloped stages, which are associated with low wages. As
noted earlier, as long as Yt is below ￿ Y i, there is a discrepancy in personal saving rates
between richer and poorer people, and inequality enhances aggregate levels of transfers,
savings, and physical capital by suppressing aggregate consumption. Equally impor-
tant, this positive eﬀect is generally more signi￿cant at lower output levels. Although,
less equal distribution causes educational inequality and low productivity of output as
discussed in Section 2.3, the positive eﬀect of inequality is proven to be dominant for
Yt ∈ (θ,Y◦].
At low levels of development, scarce amounts of physical capital together with the
capital-skill complementarity give rise to lower returns on education relative to savings,
which in turn discourages the private investment in education. Therefore, the scarcity
of physical capital, rather than credit constraints, is the prime reason for low stocks
of average human capital. Accordingly the positive impact of inequality outweighs the
negative one for Yt ≤ Y ◦.
Yet as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, the diﬀerence Φ1i(Yt) − Φ3(Yt) narrows down
as output increases towards Y ◦. The accompanying accumulation of physical capital
raises the return on skills and thereby intensi￿es the negative eﬀect of inequality on
human capital accumulation, as long as liquidity constraints are binding. The gap
between Φ1i(Yt) and Φ3(Yt) therefore shrinks as output increases towards Y ◦.23 At the
same time, inequality becomes less conductive for aggregate saving at higher levels of
Yt. Since this positive eﬀect disappears at ￿ Y i, where wt = θ,t h et w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects
of inequality oﬀset each other at Y ◦(< ￿ Y i) to the point of negating their values, and
the negative eﬀect becomes dominant for Yt >Y◦.
4.4. Inequality and the Pattern of Development
By integrating all the results demonstrated so far, one can analyze the impact of
initial income distribution on the behavior of output growth. For this purpose, we
employ the approach of comparing hypothetical economies that are identical in all
respects except for their initial distributions of wealth.
Recall that hi
0 = h(e(k0)) and adult individuals of group j initially possess neither
advanced skills nor physical capital. In the absence of redistribution,
I
j
0 = ω(Y0,λi), (50)
and Ii
0 =( Y0 − λjI
j
0)/λi by noting (39).
We limit the analysis to the case in which regardless of the initial regime, the economy
ends up with a positive amount of resources, andunskilled workers initially leave no
23Recall that the function Φ
1i(Yt) is based on the condition that liquidity constraints are binding
among poorer individuals, whereas Φ
3(Yt) is on that liquidity constraints are not binding.34
b e q u e s t s .T h i si st h ec a s ei f
Y
ﬂ
<Y 0 < ￿ Y i. (51)
Note that ￿ Y i < ￿ Y<ﬂ Y from condition (38) and Corollary 2.
Under (51) and (50), the initial state of the economy is Regime 1.A ss h o w ni n( 4 8 ) ,
the magnitude of the ratio ￿ Y i/ﬂ Y i determines the existence of the nontrivial, locally
stable, steady-state equilibrium in Regime 1.S i n c ea s u ﬃciently small (large) λi can
make ￿ Y i larger (smaller) than ﬂ Y i under assumption (38),t h el e v e lo fλi substantially
changes the growth path of the economy starting out in Regime 1.
Proposition 2. Consider the economy characterized by (38), (50),a n d(51).
i. If λi is small enough to generate ￿ Y i ≥ ﬂ Y i, the economy remains in Regime 1 for
all periods and Yt monotonically converges to the steady-state level ﬂ Y i.
ii. If λi i sl a r g ee n o u g ht og e n e r a t e￿ Y i < ﬂ Y i, Yt increases strictly monotonically over








s h o w ni nL e m m a3a n dt h a t( 5 0 )
generates a higher level of bi
0 than (52). Since bi
t in the present case corresponds to bS
t in
Figure 7, one can ￿nd that bL
t =0in all periods and bS
t converges to ﬂ bS, noting bS
t < ￿ bS
∀t ≥ 0. Then the property BY (Yt,λi) > 0 yields the behavior of Yt that corresponds to
Bt = λSbS
t .
ii. The result is proven by combining the above proof with the one in Proposition 3
and noting (bS
t ,b L
t ) increases in Regime 2.
Remark 2. In the ￿rst case of Proposition 2, Yt may decrease over time.
Figure 8 depicts the case ￿ Y S ≥ ﬂ Y S. The economy that starts oﬀ in Regime 1 fails
to take oﬀ to Regime 2. Since individuals￿ investment in human capital is subject to
diminishing marginal returns, less equal opportunities for education among individuals
retards the accumulation of aggregate human capital, and this adverse eﬀect increases
as the cost of being unskilled rises with output. Furthermore, as argued previously, the
increase in the wage income over time diminishes the positive eﬀect of inequality on
aggregate saving. Their net eﬀect on factor accumulation eventually turns negative, and
this qualitative change leads the economy starting out in Regime 1 to the lower-level
steady state.
Figure 9 depicts the case ￿ Y L < ﬂ Y L, which is brought about by a suﬃciently large
fraction of the richer members in society. Now that moderate inequality in education
opportunity mitigates the adverse eﬀect of selective human capital accumulation on
output growth, the economy with less equal distribution does not end up with Regime
1. It endogenously enters Regime 2 when the wage rate reaches the level that induces
unskilled workers to transfer wealth to their oﬀspring. Although bL
t rises concurrently
with et over Regime 2, Figure 7 ensures that bL
t eventually catches up with et,a n do n c e
that occurs, the economy enters Regime 3. Consequently Yt evolves toward ﬂ Y ,a n d35
(bS
t ,b L
t ) approaches the egalitarian steady-state point (ﬂ b,ﬂ b). Wealth inequality thus
improves in the long run, albeit not necessarily monotonically, and the evolution of
wealth inequality exhibits an inverted U-curve.












0 =( Y0 −λjI
j
0)/λi as follows from (39). Due to assumption (51), one can achieve
(52) by choosing a suﬃciently small gap between IS
0 and IL











Proposition 3. Under (38), (51), and (52),Y t increases strictly monotonically in ei-
ther Regime 2 or Regime 3 for all t ≥ 0 and converges to the steady-state level ﬂ Y in
Regime 3.






), the economy is in either Regime 2 or
Regime 3 in all periods, and eventually enters Regime 3 to approach (ﬂ b,ﬂ b). Hence Yt
correspondingly converges to ﬂ Y .
Suppose that the economy enters Regime 2 in period t>0. The diagram shows
that (bS
t ,b L
t ) ¿ (bS
t+1,b L
t+1), implying Bt <B t+1.T h u s Yt <Y t+1 follows from (40).
Since Lemma 12i m p l i e sYt < Φ3(Yt) if and only if Yt ∈ (Y
ﬂ
, ﬂ Y ), (49) shows that Y
ﬂ
<Y t <Y t+1 < ﬂ Y if the economy is in Regime 2 at time t>0.
The above result, together with Y0 ∈ (Y
ﬂ
, ﬂ Y ),p r o v e sYt <Y t+1 if the economy is in
Regime 3 at time t ≥ 0.
As follows from Propositions 2-3, the economy that has a high equality, (52), or a
moderate inequality, (50) and ￿ Y i < ﬂ Y i, evolves over time toward the highest steady-
state level of output, ﬂ Y . On the other hand, the economy with a substantially unequal
distribution, (50) and ￿ Y i ≥ ﬂ Y i, is unable to reach that level and undergoes a lower
growth path in the long run.
Theorem 2. Consider a group of countries that diﬀer only in their initial wealth dis-
tributions. Under (38) and (51),
i. If a country has a highly unequal wealth distribution in an underdeveloped stage,
it will attain higher levels of output in the short run yet converge to a lower-level
steady-state equilibrium.
ii. If a country has a highly unequal distribution of wealth in a well-developed stage,
it will attain lower levels of output in all subsequent periods and converge to a
lower-level steady-state equilibrium.
iii. If countries have similar levels of initial inequality, they will converge to the same
steady-state equilibrium, regardless of their initial regimes.
Proof. The theorem follows from Corollary 11, Propositions 2-3 and Figures 8-10.36
Overtaking in growth performance results from the initial dominance of the positive
eﬀect of inequality and the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. Furthermore, diver-
gence applies to countries starting out in the mature stages of development where the
adverse eﬀect of inequality on human capital outweighs the positive eﬀect of inequality
on aggregate saving.
A few remarks deserve special emphasis at this point. First, overtaking takes place
after the output of a lagging country reaches Y ◦. Second, the model abstracts from tech-
nological change, and the introduction of technological progress will permit steady-state
growth with a positive rate. Regardless of this formulation, inequality will constrain
output growth in the long run, as asserted by the ￿rst two results of the proposition.
Yet the last result will not hold because the convergence in growth rates does not im-
ply the convergence in income levels. Third and lastly, overtaking is likely to occur
under the condition that the marginal productivity of physical capital is suﬃciently
high. This is because ￿ b(λ) goes to in￿nity as α approaches 1, as shown earlier, whereas
this is not the case for ﬂ b(λ).24 Provided that α is suﬃciently small, a major fraction
of national income is dominated by asset owners since production of ￿nal output relies
primarily on physical capital. This uneven system of factor payments slows down the
increase in the wage income relative to output, intensifying the adverse eﬀect of credit
constraints on human capital accumulation.
4.5. Factor Accumulation
Countries starting out in diﬀerent regimes experience diﬀerent patterns of factor
accumulation. Firstly, as follows from (15), the aggregate physical capital in Regimes
1 and 3 is
K(Bt,λ) ≡ Bt − λe(k(Bt/λ,0,λ)),
whereby Kt+1 = K(Bt,λi) for Regime 1 and Kt+1 = K(Bt,1) for Regime 3. As proven
in the Appendix,
K(Bt,λi) >K (Bt,1) for Bt > 0. (53)
Recalling B(Yt,λi) ≥ B(Yt,1) for Yt ≤ ￿ Y i and Theorem 2, we ￿nd that in the early
stages of development, inequality promotes the accumulation of physical capital.
Secondly, the aggregate human capital in Regimes 1 a n d3i se x p r e s s e da s
H(Bt,λ) ≡ (1 − λ)+λh(e(k(Bt/λ,0,λ))),





24Since total output is ￿nite for any α ∈ [0,1], all individuals obtain ￿nite incomes and therefore ﬂ b(λ)
remains ￿nite for any α ∈ [0,1].37
This means that if the size of the rich is suﬃciently small, their high educational
attainments would not be re￿ected in aggregate human capital. Using this result, one
can then ￿nd a small value λi such that
H(B0
t,λi) <H(Bt,1) for 0 <B t ≤ B0
t.
Thus, despite the relative abundance of Bt, less egalitarian economies encounter a delay
in human capital accumulation in the early stages of development. As shown earlier,
this adverse eﬀect of inequality becomes dominant in later stages. This is con￿rmed by
H(Bt,λi) <H(Bt,1) for Bt > 0 and 0 < λi < 1. (54)
and by Proposition 1, which asserts that in the long run, economies in Regime 3 produce
greater amounts of aggregate transfers than those in Regime 1.
This tendency of inequality generating overinvestment in physical capital and under-
investment in human capital implies an unbalanced ratio of physical to human capital
(18) yields
k(Bt/λi,0,λi) >k (Bt,0,1) for Bt > 0, (55)
where, as shown in (19), kt+1 = k(Bt/λi,0,λi) in Regime 1 and kt+1 = k(Bt,0,1) in
Regime 3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research develops a theory about the role of inequality in the overtaking of growth
performance across countries. The proposed theory highlights two opposing eﬀects of
income inequality on factor accumulation and argue that the qualitative change in their
combined eﬀect is a prime cause of overtaking. Inequality enhances physical capital
accumulation by concentrating wealth among individuals whose marginal propensity to
save is relatively high. Conversely, in the presence of borrowing constraints, inequality
acts as a barrier to the universal investment in human capital that is a prerequisite for
sustained growth. Due to the eventual dominance of this negative eﬀect of inequality,
countries characterized by highly unequal wealth distributions will fail to take oﬀ and
be overtaken in the long run.
It is also shown that divergence or convergence may arise instead of overtaking,
depending on the initial levels of development and inequality. Suﬃciently developed
countries with diﬀerent levels of inequality will diverge in income levels. On the other
hand, countries that have similar levels of inequality will converge to the same steady
state, regardless of their initial regimes.
Although the analysis ￿nds that the eﬀect of inequality in the early stages of devel-
opment is positive, there are two major forces that make overtaking less probable than
divergence. The one is that the positive eﬀect of inequality is the dominant factor only
in underdeveloped stages, where the saving rate diﬀerential among individuals is signif-
icant. The other is that globalization of international capital markets encourages the38
￿ow of capital across borders, and domestic saving becomes less important for physical
capital accumulation. The positive aspect of inequality would thus be more relevant to
the process of development experienced by currently developed countries.
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t − et =
Kt+1/λi. It thus follows from (1), (2), (21) and (33),
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Part ii then follows, noting (57).39
If e00(kt+1) ≤ 0, ∀kt+1 > 0, Corollary 1 asserts b
ﬂ
i = bi
min and ﬂ bi = bi
max, meaning
ξj(bi
t) exists on R++\(b
ﬂ
i,ﬂ bi). Without the concavity of e(kt+1), ξj(bi
t) may not exist on
the neighbor of bi ∈ bi.
i. Note that from Lemma 14,
ΨRi(bi
t,￿ j(bi
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(58)
This, together with part ii, establishes the result.
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Therefore, there exists a function b
j
t = ζj(bi
t) such that Ψ∗i(bi
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t ≥ 0. Lemmas 2 and 5 suggest that
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These three complete the proof.
Proofs of (53) and (54). De￿ne
K(Bt,b
j
t) ≡ Bt − λjb
j
t − λie(kt+1),
where kt+1 ≡ κi(bS
t ,b L
t ). Noting bi












t ≤ et,t h e nh0(b
j




λie0(kt+1)(1 − α)[1 + h0(b
j
t)kt+1]
(1 − α)Ht+1 + λie0(kt+1)
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t < 0 for (Bt,b
j
t) ∈ R+ ￿ (0,e t].T h e n n o t i n g et > 0 for
Bt > 0,
K(Bt,e t) < K(Bt,0) for Bt > 0.
The result then follows from K(Bt,e t)=K(Bt,1) and K(Bt,0) = K(Bt,λi). (54) can
be proved in the similar way.41
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